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I. INTRODUCTION
Nebraska holds the embarrassing distinction of likely being one of
the two harshest states in the country in its treatment of citizens in-
jured at the hands of malpractice. Under current Nebraska law, if you
are injured by a medical professional’s negligence, you will not recover
more than $2.25 million. The Nebraska Hospital Medical Liability Act
(NHMLA) imposes insurmountable obstacles to even a modest recov-
ery for a seriously injured person in Nebraska. At a time when unfet-
tered medical costs in America are proliferating egregiously, the
possibility for a personal-injury plaintiff to sustain multi-million-dol-
lar special or economic damages is not only conceivable—it is increas-
ingly likely. Because these damages include the ascertainable impact
of injury upon a plaintiff, including future medical expenses and lost
wages, there are an increasing number of plaintiffs in Nebraska who
will inevitably suffer economic losses well in excess of Nebraska’s cap
on damages. This reality says nothing of general damages that may
flow from such an injury.
This Comment will first, in Part II, establish the history and pur-
pose of the damage cap under NHMLA in Nebraska. Part III will then
assess the constitutionality of Nebraska’s NHMLA damage cap, after
looking to how some of Nebraska’s sister states have treated their
caps. In particular, Part III will flesh out the unique harshness of Ne-
braska’s application of the damage cap to both noneconomic and eco-
nomic damages. Part IV will propose some practical recommendations
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for the courts, legislators, and practitioners. Specifically, Part IV will
summarize some of the inconsistencies and flaws in Nebraska law,
particularly when compared to other jurisdictions. Lastly, Part V will
conclude by reiterating the unfortunate impact Nebraska’s NHMLA
damage cap will have on many of Nebraska’s most misfortunate claim-
ants, while also reminding readers that there is opportunity for
change.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE NHMLA DAMAGE CAP
A. General Information on the Nature of Damages in
Nebraska
As a brief forward to the discussion of the NHMLA damage cap,
one must understand the distinctions between types of damage
awards in Nebraska. Nebraska generally recognizes two categories of
damages relevant to the discussion herein: economic and noneconomic
damages. It is important to recognize the distinction between eco-
nomic (oftentimes special) damages and noneconomic (or general)
damages. Both economic and noneconomic damages may be pleaded
as either special or general damages depending on their nature.1 For
example, general damages may include future medical expenses, and
special damages may include past medical expenses, both of which are
also an economic damage.2 However, because for pleading purposes
special damages are often thought of as those with an objective ascer-
tainable value, some general economic damages are oftentimes erro-
neously colloquially branded as special damages. Consequently,
within the Nebraska courts “the cases do not agree on the standard for
classifying damages as general or special.”3
Because “[t]he distinction between [general and special damages]
is unclear,”4 this Comment will use the terms “economic” and
“noneconomic” damages for the sake of clarity. As succinctly captured
by Judge Gerrard in a concurrence discussed in more detail herein:5
Economic damages include the cost of medical care, past and future, and re-
lated benefits, i.e., lost wages, loss of earning capacity, and other such losses.
Noneconomic losses include claims for pain and suffering, mental anguish, in-
jury and disfigurement not affecting earning capacity, and losses which can-
not be easily expressed in dollars and cents.6
1. See, e.g., 5 JOHN LENICH, NEBRASKA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9:20 (2019).
2. Id.; see also, e.g., Fickle v. State, 274 Neb. 267, 271, 759 N.W.2d 113, 117 (2007)
(explaining the treatment of medical damages).
3. LENICH, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.a.
6. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 961,
663 N.W.2d 43, 80 (2003) (Gerrard, J., concurring); see also 1 Neb. Prac., NJI2d
Civ. 4.00 (2019) (providing Nebraska’s basic jury instruction defining economic
and noneconomic damages).
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To the extent any quoted or referenced material herein may confuse
the distinction, this Comment will acknowledge and resolve any rele-
vant distinctions.
B. The History of NHMLA
The Nebraska Hospital Medical Liability Act was, in large part, a
response to a pair of malpractice cases resolved in the fourteen years
preceding the Act’s inception. In Spath v. Morrow, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court adopted the Discovery Rule to revive a medical negli-
gence victim’s latent injury claim,7 and in a confidential case
represented by one of the NHMLA bill’s opponents, a jury issued one
of Nebraska’s largest awards of $650,000.8 NHMLA was originally in-
troduced in 1976 as Legislative Bill (LB) 7039 and later amended into
LB 434.10 LB 703 was conceived in response to the medical lobby’s
asserted fears of “skyrocketing” insurance rates for medical providers
(which would necessarily be passed on to consumers) and was accom-
panied by grim warnings of a mass retirement or exodus of providers
from the state.11 The bill’s statement of purpose provides in part:
The enacting of this bill into law will reverse the trend toward higher mal-
practice insurance rates and should assist in holding down the total cost of
health care. Failure to enact this type of legislation could result in the loss of
professional services that are presently available to the citizens of this
state.12
At the first hearing on LB 703, the very first question of the bill’s
sponsor involved the application of the damage cap. Senator Cava-
naugh interrupted Senator Schmit’s introduction of the bill to ask
about § 19, which as originally drafted would have only permitted re-
7. Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962).
8. Hearing on LB 703 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., 84th Leg., 2d Sess.
86–87 (Neb. 1976) (testimony of Warren Schrempf, Esq.) (on file with author).
Note that the value of that award in today’s dollars is roughly $3 million.
9. LB 703, 84th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 1976) (introduced by Sen. Loran Schmit, 23d
district).
10. In a gesture of pure irony, LB 434 was a meatpacking bill. NHMLA became so
contentious that it was inserted into a bill designed to regulate the Nebraska
meatpacking industry—a bill that was universally accepted. As Senator Cham-
bers eloquently opined in the floor debates: “Everything about it is symbolic of
how the public[’]s interests are sacrificed and crushed into the ground. A meat
packers bill for a doctors bill. The butcher and the doctor are joining hands.”
Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, 84th Leg., 2d Sess. 9446 (Neb. 1976) (statement of
Sen. Ernie Chambers).
11. See, e.g., Hearing on LB 703 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., supra note
8, at 7–8 (statement of Sen. Loran Schmit); id. at 51–53 (statements of Dr. James
Dunlap).
12. Introducer’s Statement of Purpose: LB 703, 84th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 1976) (Sen.
Loran Schmit) (on file with author).
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covery of economic damages.13 Indeed, in recognizing the departure
from traditional tort damages that include noneconomic damages such
as pain and suffering, Senator Schmit expressed, “The only recovery
for pain and suffering would be as to how it refers or relates to actual
economic loss.”14 When pressed again, Senator Schmit continued:
I feel, Senator Cavanaugh, that in order to find some method whereby we can
find a reasonable solution to the rates for malpractice, there has to be some
kind of limitation, and that is the limitation we provide under the bill, which I
believe pretty effectively limits any so-called wild settlements for pain and
suffering. It must be related to economic loss, and I feel it’s a valid
limitation.15
Section 19 of the bill was completely stricken from the final draft,
demonstrating the Legislature’s rejection of a law that would award
only economic damages, and instead, favoring the allowance of recov-
ery for pain and suffering, though potentially limited.16 Testimony in
front of the full Legislature, prior to the vote which struck § 19, ex-
pressed favor for traditional damages that encompass the panoply of
damages otherwise comprising Nebraska law.17 Considering Senator
Schmit’s intent to mitigate “wild” awards, in conjunction with the fact
that the Legislature rejected the economic-only damages provision,
the policy expressed by the final Act was merely to limit “wild” pain
and suffering damages. Indeed, even Senator Schmit expressed in the
committee hearing: “I believe that the recovery for pain and suffering
should be limited to the fact the amount would be justified by virtue of
his limitation of his occupation and no further than that.”18 In the
floor debates following rejection of § 19, Senator Cavanaugh explained
the bill’s focus on precluding excessive pain and suffering damages,
but not other forms of future damages: “I don’t think that what you
are giving up here is the widow[’]s right to compensation for loss of
consortium which is now a measure of damage, you are depriving her
of any recovery for the pain and suffering that her husband may have
undergone.”19
The committee heard testimony on just one “highly unique” case
involving damages beyond what would become the Act’s original
$500,000 cap.20 On one hand, it could be argued discussion of that
13. Hearing on LB 703 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., supra note 8, at
9–11.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, supra note 10, at 8630–33.
17. Id. at 8631.
18. Hearing on LB 703 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., supra note 8, at 11
(emphasis added).
19. Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, supra note 10, at 8627. The Legislature also ap-
proved of testimony on the floor to the applicability of pecuniary damages and
future earnings, for example. Id. at 8627, 8631.
20. Hearing on LB 703 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., supra note 8, at 92.
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case indicates the committee understood there to be a possibility of
economic damages exceeding what would come to be the agreed-upon
cap because that testimony included discussion of an economist’s find-
ing in that case of future special damages exceeding $1 million.21 On
the other hand, the committee’s interest seemed to reside in the 40%
attorney’s fee and the fact that a permanently comatose victim was
awarded $400,000.22 This suggests the committee did not contemplate
a scenario where “actual” economic damages could approach the cap.
In fact, when questioned by another senator as to whether the
court system had broken down by allowing “skyrocketing” claims, Sen-
ator Schmit acknowledged the speculative nature of the malpractice
concerns when he conceded, “I would say that it would boil down to
one word of explanation, and that is fear—fear of the unknown.”23
Senator Schmit went on to assert that “the recovery situation becomes
an emotional one. The individual is injured, and then it becomes a
question of what actually occurred, and it is very easy to be carried
away.”24 Considered as a whole, the testimony at the hearings cen-
tered around the need to limit noneconomic damages, specifically pain
and suffering.25 The original $500,000 cap, in conjunction with the re-
jection of the “economic-only” damages provision (§ 19 of the original
bill), reflected the Legislature’s intent that such a value would suffi-
ciently compensate economic losses and mitigate “wild” pain and suf-
fering claims.26
Since its inception, the NHMLA cap has been revised every decade
or so to adjust for inflation.27 As will be discussed herein, infra section
III.B, many challenges to the NHMLA damage cap have arisen in the
courts in the intervening decades. Most challenges have focused on
the cap’s constitutionality, in accord with other states, but Nebraska
has held fast (despite no shortage of strong arguments) in maintaining
that the Act poses no constitutional concern. At present, Nebraska’s
medical malpractice cap applies to combined economic and
21. Id. at 86–90.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 21.
25. See generally id.
26. See, e.g., Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb.
918, 963–64, 663 N.W.2d 43, 81–82 (2003) (Gerrard, J., concurring) (noting that
the “parliamentary maneuvering” of placing LB 703 into the meatpacking bill is
to blame for the Act’s defeat of the Legislature’s original intent to apply the cap
only to general damages).
27. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2018). The original
1976 cap at $500,000 roughly inflates to the $2.25 million that has currently been
in effect for the past five years, and adjustments are made approximately every
decade. See id.
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noneconomic damages, putting Nebraska at odds with the overwhelm-
ing majority of states.28
III. ARGUMENT
This Part will explore the numerous ways in which Nebraska has
fallen out of conformity with nearly every other state with respect to
its application of damage caps.
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.29
The following argument is broken into two main sections, the first
of which looks at the laws and cases of some of Nebraska’s sister
states, and the second of which looks at Nebraska’s precedent on dam-
age caps, by way of comparison. Specifically, section III.A will look at
the variety of constitutional rationales other courts have used to de-
clare their caps unconstitutional. Section III.B will compare many of
those holdings with Nebraska’s position on similar constitutional ar-
guments. Section III.B will also detail how Nebraska’s obstinance in
defending a position of constitutional validity regarding caps is con-
trary to the majority of her sister states.
A. Interjurisdictional Precedent
1. Fifty-State Survey of Caps
States have taken a wide variety of approaches to erecting and
often dismantling their assorted damage caps. As a preliminary note,
it is important to recognize that at the time Nebraska’s NHMLA cap
was first invoked, it was understood to be among the most liberal in
the country.30 It is also worth noting up front that to draw allusions
and distinctions across jurisdictions is a far cry from an apples to ap-
ples comparison because of the varied underlying state constitutions
and statutory schemes. However, to the extent that they share many
common themes and characteristics, much of the analysis below will
at least bear some metaphorical fruit.
28. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary,
CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY N.Y. L. SCH. (June 20, 2019), https://centerjd.org/
content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damages-state-law-summary [https://
perma.unl.edu/6QL2-QSQN] (providing a concise visual overview of Nebraska’s
minority stance on caps).
29. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path
of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University
School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
30. Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, supra note 10, at 8796.
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The vast majority of states generally disfavor caps.31 Nine states
have constitutional provisions expressly barring caps on damages, ei-
ther generally, or specifically at least to wrongful death cases.32
States take a varied approach to assigning caps to specific areas of
their law, which can be broken into four general categories relevant to
this Comment: (1) punitive damage caps; (2) medical malpractice dam-
age caps; (3) products liability damage caps; and (4) general tort injury
damage caps. It is not uncommon for the caps on these different cate-
gories to vary within each state that uses them, reflecting states’ in-
terests in adopting different policies on damage recovery for different
types of claims. The Nebraska Legislature has not adopted a policy
barring caps against torts generally, nor against products liability
cases.33 The following synthesis will summarize the interjurisdic-
tional use of medical malpractice damage caps.
a. Interjurisdictional Legislative Caps
In order to compare the apples and oranges that follow, this Com-
ment will address several specific distinctions relevant to the compari-
son of medical malpractice caps under Nebraska law. First, a relevant
factor in the analysis is whether a state’s present lack of caps is reflec-
tive of its legislature’s disinterest in caps in the first instance, or
whether such nonexistence of caps reflects judicial intervention by
striking any such caps down. Second, the availability of punitive dam-
ages in other states deserves attention given the impact of such dam-
ages on otherwise limited claims. Third, the most crucial distinction to
bear in mind is that there is a sharp difference between caps on
noneconomic damages and caps on total damages, including economic
damages.
The following series of comparisons will set the tone for Nebraska’s
current status as an outlier in medical malpractice damage caps.
First, however, there is one area where Nebraska has positioned itself
with the majority: forty-one states (plus the District of Columbia) have
no generally-applicable cap on noneconomic tort damages—Nebraska
is among them.34 Nine states compose a minority which does gener-
ally cap noneconomic tort damages.35 A small majority of twenty-nine
states, however, impose some cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases.36 Again, Nebraska is among them. Nine states’
31. See Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary, supra
note 28. Note that this page contains some errors but serves as a fairly accurate
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constitutions prohibit capping damages, either generally, or specifi-
cally for wrongful death cases.37 Nebraska is not among this last
minority.
i. Punitive Damage Caps
Where Nebraska drastically parts ways with her sister states be-
gins with her effective bar on punitive damages. “It has been a funda-
mental rule of law in this state that punitive, vindictive, or exemplary
damages will not be allowed . . . . This rule is so well settled that we
dispose of it merely by the citation of cases so holding.”38 Accordingly,
Nebraska courts consistently hold that punitive damages “contravene
Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5, and thus are not allowed in this jurisdic-
tion.”39 Technically, punitive damages do not “contravene” that sec-
tion of the Nebraska Constitution, which merely provides that
penalizing damages “shall be appropriated exclusively to the use and
support of the common schools in the respective subdivisions where
the same may accrue.”40 Regardless, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has found that “[s]ince all penalties must go to the benefit of the com-
mon schools of the state, a penalty for the benefit of a private person is
violative of the cited constitutional provisions.”41 Consequently,
though not technically impermissible or in contravention of the Ne-
braska constitution, punitive damages are so rarely sought in Ne-
braska that even the United States Supreme Court has noted their
lack of availability: “State regulation of punitive damages varies. A
few States award them rarely, or not at all. Nebraska bars punitive
damages entirely, on state constitutional grounds.”42
Nebraska is therefore one of only four states that have erected poli-
cies effectively barring punitive damages.43 Louisiana has a general
ban on punitive damages but provides exceptions for cases involving
drunk driving, child pornography and molestation, or the applicable
laws of other states.44 Washington also generally bars punitive dam-
37. Id. (noting the following states: Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wyoming).
38. Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 929, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (1960).
39. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 232 Neb. 846, 857, 443 N.W.2d 566,
574 (1989).
40. NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
41. Abel, 170 Neb. at 932, 104 N.W.2d at 689.
42. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495 (2008).
43. Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1297, 1304 (2005). Note that this article misspeaks in saying that Massa-
chusetts bars punitive damages by inadvertently citing to its slander and libel
statute in lieu of other tort statutes.
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3546 (2019); Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 2010-244
(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/27/10); 49 So. 3d 529, 551, rev’d in part on other grounds,
2010-2605 (La. 3/13/12); 89 So. 3d 307.
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ages, with few statutory exceptions.45 New Hampshire, despite a law
entitled “Punitive Damages Outlawed,”46 has embraced a doctrine of
“enhanced compensatory damages” which effectively serves the same
purpose as punitive damages in some circumstances, including per-
sonal injury cases.47 A handful of other states have similarly rejected
“punitive” damages in lieu of functionally identical damage doctrines
such as “exemplary” damages.48 Another twenty-three states do cap
punitive damages, and there is a growing trend among those states to
tie the punitive damage cap to a multiplier of the actual or compensa-
tory damages, typically by a factor of three times the compensatory
damages.49 The remaining twenty-four punitive-permitting states not
only permit punitive damages but provide no express cap.50
ii. Medical Malpractice Caps51
Nebraska technically joins the modest majority of thirty-one states
which have some type of cap on medical malpractice damages. The
45. Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 436 P.2d 186, 187 (Wash. 1968) (“From Spokane
Truck and Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072, 11 L.R.A. 689 (1891), to
the present day, this court has held that the doctrine of punitive damages is un-
sound in principle and that such damages cannot be recovered in this jurisdic-
tion, absent statutory authorization.”).
46. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2020).
47. See, e.g., Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 289 A.2d 66, 67 (N.H. 1972).
48. See, e.g., Gilroy v. Conway, 391 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (“In Michi-
gan, however, the purpose of exemplary damages has not been to punish the de-
fendant but to render the plaintiff whole by compensating for mental injury.”).
49. See, e.g., David Goguen, State-by-State Medical Malpractice Damages Caps,
NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-state-medical-malpractice-
damages-caps.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5FSZ-CFU7] (last visited May 15,
2020). One note of interest is that the “treble damages” approach being recently
embraced by many of these states as a measure of punitive damages was actually
considered by the Nebraska Supreme Court nearly a hundred years ago in the
case that arguably first concluded such damages must be payable to the school
fund under the Nebraska Constitution. See Sunderland Bros. Co. v. Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy R.R. Co., 104 Neb. 319, 179 N.W. 546 (1920).
50. See Personal Injury Damages Caps by State, PENNYGEEKS (Jan. 2, 2020), https://
pennygeeks.com/legal-resources/personal-injury-damages-caps/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/4GXP-5SCZ]; Goguen, supra note 49. Note that the Supreme
Court has ruled that a “grossly excessive” punitive damages award, determined
on a case-by-case basis, may violate the due process of a defendant. See, e.g., TXO
Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (citing Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)). However, the Court has consistently found
under this test that punitive damages in excess of ten times the other damages
did not implicate a Due Process violation. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Only when an award can fairly be categorized as
‘grossly excessive’ in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrari-
ness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); TXO
Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 458.
51. For the following analysis, there is no applicable fifty-state survey, so the easiest
way to visualize the interjurisdictional law is by reviewing the fairly accurate
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remaining states either have constitutional provisions forbidding
damage caps, have found constitutional infirmity with their caps, or
have legislatively adopted a policy contrary to limiting recovery from
medical malpractice, though several do cap punitive damages. Of the
majority which embraces malpractice caps of some type, caps range in
value from $250,000 to $2.4 million. Officially, Nebraska has the sec-
ond-highest cap amount, currently at $2.25 million. However, as will
be clarified herein, Nebraska’s application of this cap to all forms of
recovery places her at dramatic odds with her sister states, and actu-
ally makes Nebraska one of the three most limited-recovery states.
Twenty-seven of the thirty-one states with a malpractice cap in
place exclude the application of the cap from economic damages, in-
cluding future medical damages and earnings. Nebraska, by contrast,
applies the cap to economic damages as well as noneconomic damages.
Nebraska is among the four states that apply the cap to total dam-
ages. Of those four, Louisiana specifically excludes future medical
damages from the harsh application of the total cap on recovery. The
remaining states, Nebraska (capped at $2.25 million),52 Virginia ($2.4
million),53 and Indiana ($1.8 million),54 have the three highest ex-
press cap values in the country, which is again deceptive considering
that those values cap total damages, oftentimes precluding any recov-
ery for future economic, let alone noneconomic, damages. In a modern
economy of inflated healthcare costs, suffice it to say that even an av-
erage malpractice claimant’s economic damages alone are likely to ex-
ceed those values, particularly where there is permanent injury that
results in lost earnings, future medical expenses, or other foreseeable
losses. This is increasingly true, even after the mandatory reduction to
present value.55 All of this limitation says nothing of the reality that
such a claimant is likely to receive no recovery for noneconomic dam-
ages. This surely surpasses the limitation on “wild” pain and suffering
awards contemplated by the Legislature in enacting NHMLA. In such
inevitable and increasingly voluminous cases, Nebraska nevertheless
holds the esteemed distinction of providing nearly the lowest recovery
online compilations. See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A
State Law Summary, supra note 28; Goguen, supra note 49; Personal Injury
Damages Caps by State, supra note 50; W. McDonald Plosser, United States:
Sky’s the Limit? A 50-State Survey of Damages Caps and the Collateral Source
Rule, MONDAQ (Dec. 11, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/762574/
Insurance/Skys+The+Limit+A+50State+Survey+Of‡amages+Caps+And+The+
Collateral+Source+Rule [https://perma.unl.edu/L79X-687Y].
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2019). As of July 1, 2020, Virginia’s cap will be
increased to $2.45 million.
54. IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2019).
55. See, e.g., Patras ex rel. Patras v. Waldbaum, 170 Neb. 20, 24–25, 101 N.W.2d 465,
468 (1960) (discussing reduction to present value for future damages).
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in the country, second only to Indiana whose total bar on recovery is
half a million dollars lower.56
b. Interjurisdictional Judicial Action on Caps
At least eight of the twenty states without damage caps have found
noneconomic damage caps specifically to be unconstitutional, and
their legislatures have not re-passed subsequent legislation.57 Again,
despite the varied language in different states’ constitutions, compari-
sons in rationale are largely insightful but must be carefully qualified.
However, there are some general themes that are worth exploring,
particularly where the constitutional language and analyses mirror
Nebraska’s. Below are some of the leading rationales relied upon by
other states in finding their former caps unconstitutional in whole or
in part. It is worth noting up front that the United States Supreme
Court has regularly declined to meddle in the states’ authority to de-
fine and impose their own damage caps, except to suggest that puni-
tive damages awards may face strict constitutional scrutiny if they
approach ten times the value of the compensatory damages.58 There-
fore, states are largely left to their own devices in interpreting their
caps under their respective constitutions.
i. Right to a Jury
As an early example of judicial intervention in malpractice caps,
Washington found its cap on noneconomic damages to be unconstitu-
tional after considering the Right to a Jury provision of its state con-
stitution.59 The court noted that even by that time several other states
had already found similar caps unconstitutional, candidly stating that
“[c]ases upholding damage limits either have not analyzed the jury’s
role in the matter or have not engaged in the historical constitutional
analysis used by this court in construing the right to a jury.”60 Nota-
bly, the Washington Right to a Jury constitutional provision is nearly
identical to Nebraska’s.61
Two years later, the Alabama Supreme Court engaged in what has
become a standard analysis,62 finding that where its constitution pro-
vides that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,” neither
56. See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (Reissue 2010 &
Cum. Supp. 2018).
57. See Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary, supra
note 28.
58. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 495 (2008); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
59. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
60. Id. at 723.
61. Compare NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6, with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21.
62. See, e.g., Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga.
2010).
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the legislature nor the courts may “interfere” with or “impair” a jury’s
findings of noneconomic damages.63 Notably, this language is also
nearly identical to Nebraska’s.64 The court framed the question over
the meaning of “inviolate” as whether a person’s right to a jury’s unob-
structed damage assessment was protected (and thus inviolate),
rather than looking to whether the right to damages existed at com-
mon law when its constitution was enacted.65
Most recently, the Kansas Supreme Court reached an identical
conclusion based on constitutional provisions also nearly identical to
Nebraska’s.66 In its opinion, the Kansas court expressly rejected Ne-
braska’s finding in Gourley, infra subsection III.B.1.a, that it was per-
missible under the constitution’s “inviolate” language for the
legislature to “substitute” its determinations in lieu of those necessa-
rily reserved for a jury.67 After analyzing the functional similarity be-
tween the Kansas and Nebraska state constitutions with respect to
the right to a jury, the Kansas court concluded that “the cap’s effect is
to disturb the jury’s finding of fact on the amount of the award. Al-
lowing this substitutes the Legislature’s nonspecific judgment for the
jury’s specific judgment. The people deprived the Legislature of that
power when they made the right to trial by jury inviolate.”68
Several of the other states that have found caps tacitly unconstitu-
tional have relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases such as
Dimick v. Schiedt, which address the special and reserved role of a
jury in determining damages.69 The Supreme Court’s position is con-
sistently that the jury is uniquely positioned and entrusted with as-
sessing damages. This practice in the United States has evolved
slightly from the common law tradition in cases where damages are
“so unreasonable as to show that the jury has not approached the sub-
ject in a proper judicial temper”; in these cases American court judges
are given discretion to propose remittitur of the excessive damages.70
However, this discretion is based on an awardee’s option to either con-
sent to remittitur of the excess damages or allow the opposition’s re-
quest for a new trial.71 The judges may not interfere with the jury’s
fact-finding role by inserting their own finding and modifying the
damage award.
63. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 161–63 (Ala. 1991).
64. Compare NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6, with ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
65. Mobile Infirmary, 592 So. 2d at 161–63. This case discussed both the Virginia and
Washington constitutional challenges.
66. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 523 (Kan. 2019).
67. Id. at 522–23.
68. Id. at 524.
69. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
70. Id. at 482.
71. Id.
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States that have found their caps unconstitutional under the right
to jury trial theory have noted that the right to a jury trial—including
the jury’s factual findings—is a right that existed at common law
when their constitutions took effect.72 These courts often make find-
ings such as: “The very existence of the caps, in any amount, is viola-
tive of the right to trial by jury.”73 In addressing contentions that a
legislature may in fact modify the common law, the courts note that
the legislature may not, however, “abrogate constitutional rights that
may inhere in common law causes of action.”74
ii. Open Courts
Florida was an early state to find that its malpractice damage
caps, even for noneconomic damages, were unconstitutional based on
its Open Courts article. The court found that the Open Courts article
must be read in conjunction with the Right to a Jury section because
the redress guaranteed by the Open Courts provision necessarily de-
pends upon the jury’s findings, which are precluded when the legisla-
ture places a mandate on its findings.75 Notably, the relevant
language in both the Open Courts provision and the Right to a Jury
provision of the Florida Constitution is functionally identical to Ne-
braska’s constitution.76 The Texas Open Courts provision is also
nearly identical to Nebraska’s,77 and a year after Florida’s decision,
Texas relied on the same reasoning to find its medical malpractice cap
on damages unconstitutional.78
iii. Equal Protection
Alabama was an early example of a successful Equal Protection
challenge to malpractice damage caps. In 1991 the Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that its legislature had created unreasonable classifica-
tions that limited recovery only for the most seriously injured citizens
of the state, treating one class differently than another based merely
on the severity of an injury.79 In so finding, the court held that the
72. See, e.g., Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 223
(Ga. 2010).
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Dimick, 293 U.S. at 487).
75. Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088–89 (Fla. 1987).
76. Compare FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 21, 22, with NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 13. Also, this
may support the rationale Nebraska courts use in their frequent reliance on Flor-
ida’s construction of the law. See Stefanie S. Pearlman, Persuasive Authority and
the Nebraska Supreme Court: Are Certain Jurisdictions or Secondary Resources
More Persuasive Than Others?, NEB. LAW., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 33.
77. Compare TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13, with NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
78. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988).
79. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 167 (Ala. 1991).
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correlation between the state’s interest in reducing medical costs and
the noneconomic damage cap was “at best, indirect and remote.”80
That same year New Hampshire also found its cap on personal in-
jury noneconomic damages unconstitutional under its Equal Protec-
tion clause, expanding a previous decision that found only the state’s
malpractice cap to be unconstitutional on these grounds.81 It is nota-
ble that the New Hampshire court reached both of these decisions
merely on a rational basis analysis, focusing on an injured plaintiff’s
important substantive right to recovery.82 In both states, and several
others since, Equal Protection challenges to caps often rest on the
finding under either rational basis or intermediate scrutiny that a leg-
islature’s classification of more severely injured plaintiffs (who are im-
pacted by the cap) is either arbitrary or lacking a substantial relation
to a legislative purpose, respectively.83
iv. Separation of Powers
Illinois recently took a unique approach to finding its malpractice
damage cap unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Illinois court had
noted favorably Washington’s finding that a court and its jury are bet-
ter positioned than the legislature to make case-by-case findings re-
quired by the constitution,84 vesting the courts with the exclusive
authority to reduce verdicts.85 Under this rationale, the Illinois court
ultimately found that the legislative act capping damages “unduly en-
croaches upon the fundamentally judicial prerogative of determining
whether a jury’s assessment of damages is excessive within the mean-
ing of the law.”86 The rationales of the Illinois courts are particularly
availing considering the Nebraska constitution was modeled expressly
after the Illinois constitution.87
v. Special Legislation
Illinois also found its malpractice damage caps unconstitutional as
violative of its constitution’s Special Legislation article.88 Despite
80. Id. at 168.
81. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991).
82. Id. at 1234–35; Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980), overruled on
other grounds by Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 917 A.2d 707
(N.H. 2007).
83. Mobile Infirmary, 592 So. 2d at 167; Brannigan, 587 A.2d 1232.
84. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723 (Wash. 1989) (declaring Washing-
ton’s damage caps violative of the state’s Right to a Jury provision).
85. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1081 (Ill. 1997).
86. Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 908 (Ill. 2010) (quoting Best, 689
N.E.2d at 1080).
87. ROBERT D. MIEWALD, PETER J. LONGO, & ANTHONY B. SCHUTZ, THE NEBRASKA
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 17 (2d ed. 2009).
88. Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976).
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some linguistic differences between the Illinois and Nebraska Special
Legislation provisions, the courts of the states rely on a functionally
identical analysis that asks whether the legislation creates “unreason-
able or arbitrary” classifications that confer a benefit or privilege on
that class.89 The Illinois court began its analysis by reviewing a previ-
ous holding that a similar damage cap (in the state’s Workers’ Com-
pensation Act) violated its constitution’s Equal Protection clause by
creating an arbitrary classification that only restricted recovery for
the most seriously injured victims.90 Analogizing the two cases, the
court held that the legislature, with the malpractice cap, had also cre-
ated an arbitrary classification benefiting medical providers to the
exclusion of other tortfeasors, thus violating the Special Legislation
provision.91 Recently, Oklahoma joined the ranks of finding noneco-
nomic tort damage caps violative of its analogous Special Legislation
provision on similar grounds.92
2. Interjurisdictional Summary
Nebraska is the only state (according to the Supreme Court) that
completely (or at least effectively) bars punitive damages, but it also
has the second most restrictive recovery on medical malpractice
awards in the country. As is evident, a brief survey of some of the
states that have rejected caps demonstrates a wide variety of applica-
ble theories under which Nebraska’s damage caps are unconstitu-
tional. The selected cases are particularly availing because of the
underlying similarities between the challenged constitutional lan-
guage of the sister states involved.
Even regardless of textual similarities or differences between Ne-
braska’s constitutional provisions and those of her sister states, the
states are engaged in a “common interpretive enterprise,” whereby
every state will benefit from embracing the interpretive themes of its
sister states regarding the substance of their constitutions.93 To the
extent there is no true originalism in state constitutions—or at least
no originalism that a state’s citizens relate to—a unified interpreta-
tion of the substantive principles of states’ constitutions will en-
courage, rather than inhibit, productive federalism.94 Further, many
benefits to states arise when they focus on the substance rather than
the linguistic dissimilarities of other states’ interpretations of their
89. Compare id., with Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 851–52, 620
N.W.2d 339, 345 (2000).
90. Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741–42.
91. Id. at 743.
92. Beason v. I.E. Miller Servs., Inc., 441 P.3d 1107, 1111–12 (Okla. 2019).
93. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1162–63 (1993).
94. See id. at 1162–68.
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constitutional principles.95 States may draw on the experience of
other states, and a unified interpretation of the substantive principles
underlying state constitutions will provide state courts guidance in fu-
ture constitutional analyses.96 Lastly, a unified state interpretive
front is more likely to influence the Federal  Supreme Court, when
necessary, for the protection of constitutional rights that are shared
not only among the states but with the Federal Constitution as well.
Considering the frequency and volume of other states’ substantive
constitutional interpretations that are contrary to Nebraska’s, regard-
less of textual similarities, it is likely time for Nebraska to revisit its
holdings from a principled and substantive standpoint. Of note is that
none—not one—of the states to find their caps unconstitutional were
even faced with considering caps on actual, quantifiable, economic
damages. Nebraska is one of only three states that cap actual, ascer-
tainable damages that a plaintiff will have to pay for out of pocket as a
result of a professional’s negligence. Faced with the vast majority of
states that continue to find even noneconomic damage caps unconsti-
tutional, Nebraska’s stalwart prevention of plaintiffs being made
whole seems even more insulting to her injured citizens.
B. Theories of Unconstitutionality
1. Nebraska Constitution
Nebraska’s stubborn support of the NHMLA’s total cap on recovery
has not been for lack of effort in raising challenges. Notably, many of
the states on which the Nebraska Supreme Court has formerly relied
in defense of its holdings have since reversed course. Not to mention
that those very states and others now cite to Nebraska’s cases as ex-
amples of what their policy seeks to avoid. Perhaps it bears reminding
that at the time Nebraska’s cap was implemented, the Nebraska Leg-
islature intended it to be among the highest in the country. Because
the policy of most of Nebraska’s sister states has reverted to more eq-
uitable terms since the tort reform in the 1970s, when Nebraska be-
gan its charade into inequity, it is a good time to revisit some of the
antiquated arguments on which Nebraska courts rely.
Nebraska’s first foray into the fray of constitutional challenges to
damage caps began in 1977, one year after the NHMLA’s birth. In
Prendergast v. Nelson, the Nebraska Supreme Court first held that
the NHMLA was constitutional on several grounds.97 In an interest-
ing twist, the plaintiff in the case was a medical professional, and the
defendant was the Nebraska Director of Insurance, who was refusing
95. Goodwin Liu, State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 YALE L.J. 1304,
1330–40 (2019).
96. Id. at 1313–14.
97. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
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to implement the Act.98 Restated for emphasis, the Director of Insur-
ance for Nebraska, charged with administering the Act for the insur-
ance industry, was the first to raise constitutional arguments against
that very Act, despite his support role to the lobby that vehemently
supported the Act.
Relevant to this Comment, one of his key challenges was to the
cap. The court introduced the Director’s Special Legislation challenge
to the cap thusly: “It is argued that a ceiling on judgments constitutes
a special privilege for the health care provider and an undue restric-
tion on the seriously injured patient. In this respect it must be
remembered the Nebraska procedure is an elective one.”99 A crucial
note about the NHMLA is that, technically, it is elective—a recipient
of medical treatment may “elect” to opt out of the Act’s operation.100
To do so, claimant-apparents must file an elect-out with the Director
of Insurance and notify their health care provider prior to any medical
treatment from which they could possibly develop an actionable
injury.101
So, suppose you’re on a stretcher being wheeled into the hospital
for what should ultimately be a routine medical procedure. Under the
NHMLA, if you are disinterested in the harsh effects of the damage
cap, you must first interrupt the paramedics to demand an opportu-
nity to notify the Director of Insurance, as well as your health care
provider. It is certainly reasonable that this should be a patient’s first
thought. One of the four separate dissents in Prendergast captured the
problem from a policy perspective, somewhat more delicately:
The majority opinion’s partial reliance on the elective provisions of the act is
misplaced. The reality of the freedom to elect by a claimant was not consid-
ered and is not easily demonstrable. Such an election provision ignores the
inequality of bargaining power. The very nature of a person’s status as a pa-
tient places him in a position which makes effective bargaining difficult. A
right to elect not to be covered, from which might result a denial of service
from the only hospital or physician in a geographical area, can hardly be said
to be without implicit coercion. The consideration that the election may result
in termination of services, or refusal by health care providers to give service,
because of knowledge that the patient has previously filed a notice with the
state Department of Insurance not to be covered, will cause a thoughtful per-
son to use caution in exercising the right.102
Regardless, to the extent such a waiver can be construed as elec-
tive, it was the court’s first defense of the NHMLA damage cap. Seem-
ingly blending the Director’s Special Legislation and Equal Protection
arguments, the court engaged in a brief recitation of the Act’s pur-
98. Id. at 100, 256 N.W.2d at 662.
99. Id. at 114–15, 256 N.W.2d at 668–69.
100. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821(2) (Reissue 2010).
101. Id.
102. Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 676–77 (White, J., dissenting in
part).
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ported goal of benefiting claimants, who will be more likely to recover
because of the Act’s ability to keep malpractice insurance costs low
enough that providers are likely to be covered. Indeed, the court regu-
larly prefaced its constitutional analyses with quotations from the Act
such as: “[the Act’s purpose is] to serve the public interest by provid-
ing an alternative method for determining malpractice claims in order
to improve the availability of medical care, to improve its quality and
to reduce the cost thereof, and to insure the availability of malpractice
insurance coverage at reasonable rates.”103
The court discussed these specious guarantees thusly: “[T]he Ne-
braska law provides quid pro quo. In return for relatively minor re-
strictions on the remedy and the ceiling of $500,000, the patient
receives assurance of collect[a]bility of any judgment recov-
ered . . . .”104 The court then concluded that though “laws may result
in some inequality . . . a legitimate legislative objective is being fur-
thered by the act.”105 An important note in this seminal case is the
court’s conclusory finding that “[n]othing in the act suggests, as defen-
dant infers, that the legislation involved was enacted for the relief of
the medical care provider.”106 Bear in mind that, as the brief excerpts
from the committee hearings and floor debates on NHMLA illustrate,
the entire purpose of the cap was to relieve medical providers from the
“wild” jury awards and “skyrocketing” insurance prices.
Regardless, such was the incunabulum of the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s defense of damage caps in Nebraska. As will be explored be-
low, the Director of Insurance in Prendergast raised Equal Protection,
Due Process, Open Courts, Right to a Jury, Special Legislation, and
Granting Credit of the State arguments in his opening salvo on the
Act.107 In the intervening forty-two years, there has been no shortage
of sound arguments that maintain opposition to the cap. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court has not faltered in holding fast against the tide
of changing interjurisdictional precedent and novel challenges from
within our borders. Following is a brief summary of the multitudinous
challenges to the caps in Nebraska, accompanying commentary on the
strength of the arguments, and notes on the ways in which Nebraska
laws and the laws of her sister states have changed, as relevant. As a
final preface to the arguments raised below, it is worth reflecting on
one conclusion the Prendergast court made: “In enacting the medical
malpractice damage limitations, the Legislature is doing no more than
103. Id. at 112, 256 N.W.2d at 667 (majority opinion) (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-
2801(1) (1976)).
104. Id. at 120–21, 256 N.W.2d at 671.
105. Id. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 100, 256 N.W.2d at 662.
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legislatures of other states have done . . . .”108 Considering that all but
two other states have since rejected such legislative caps, it seems in-
creasingly spurious to hang our hat on such sophistry.
a. Right to a Jury
The Prendergast court addressed the Director’s challenge on Right
to a Jury grounds in the context of whether NHMLA’s imposition of an
optional “Medical Review Panel” interfered with a role reserved to the
jury.109 The Nebraska court discussed at length that the Panel does
not replace a jury (which a claimant is certainly entitled to after the
Panel concludes its review of the case), but rather supplements the
claimant’s later case with additional findings. In so finding, the Ne-
braska court quoted Justice Brandeis’s Supreme Court notation in an
analogous federal case that “the ultimate determination of issues of
fact by the jury [must] be not interfered with.”110 Ironically, that very
rationale was used by many of Nebraska’s sister states to find their
caps unconstitutional.111 Specifically, findings of damages are ques-
tions of fact, and the jury—not the court—must make the ultimate
determination of damages, precluding the courts from reducing
damages.112
Indeed, in 2003 the Nebraska Supreme Court revisited the Right to
a Jury challenge under the state constitution, relying on many in-
terjurisdictional decisions which have, since 2003, been reversed.113
In Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health System, Inc.,
the court was faced with a case involving negligent prenatal medical
care which left the plaintiff with special needs that the family ex-
pected would cost over $12.4 million over his lifetime.114 Despite a
$5.6 million award, the plaintiff was awarded a capped total of $1.25
million under NHMLA. In response to this judicial insult the plain-
tiff’s mother stated, “We feel, you have a right to a jury trial.”115
The court, displaying its evasive maneuverability, found that “[t]he
primary function of a jury has always been factfinding, which includes
a determination of a plaintiff’s damages. The court, however, applies
108. Id. at 121, 256 N.W.2d at 672.
109. Id. at 106, 256 N.W.2d at 665.
110. Id. at 108, 256 N.W.2d at 665 (quoting Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310
(1920)).
111. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 514 (Kan. 2019).
112. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (noting that the determination of
damages is a question of fact which is properly reserved for the jury).
113. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 953,
663 N.W.2d 43, 75 (2003).
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the law to the facts. . . . The remedy is a question of law, not fact, and
is not a matter to be decided by the jury.”116 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Nebraska Supreme Court relied primarily on Adams ex rel.
Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital.117 Adams was a Missouri case
that was overruled several years later specifically because the Mis-
souri Supreme Court decided that the state constitution’s Right to a
Jury provision (complete with language functionally identical to Ne-
braska’s) did in fact render their malpractice cap unconstitutional.118
One of the last holdout states on malpractice damage cap constitution-
ality was Kansas, which very recently called out and specifically re-
jected Gourley’s reasoning to find Kansas’s cap unconstitutional under
its Right to a Jury provision.119
In Schmidt v. Ramsey, the Eighth Circuit charged into the NH-
MLA battlefield and, relying predominantly on Nebraska precedent,
addressed many NHMLA challenges brought under the Federal Con-
stitution.120 In Ramsey, the plaintiff was awarded $17 million in med-
ical malpractice damages in federal court, under Nebraska’s NHMLA,
following an infant’s botched delivery.121 It was the largest jury award
for medical malpractice in the state’s history.122 Facing the cap’s re-
duction under the NHMLA to $1.75 million, counsel for the plaintiff
optimistically opined after the award that the cap was unconstitu-
tional.123 The plaintiff raised federal constitutional challenges under
Right to a Jury, the Takings Clause, Open Courts, Equal Protection,
and Substantive Due Process.
With respect to the Right to a Jury argument, the Ramsey court
spun a chicken-or-the-egg argument on the application of the Seventh
Amendment. The circuit court concluded that the NHMLA cap “does
not determine damages in the first instance. The jury in this case per-
formed its historical role by finding liability and assessing damages.
The Nebraska cap imposed an upper legal limit on that jury determi-
nation.”124 This suggests that the court simultaneously found that the
116. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 953–54, 663 N.W.2d at 75 (internal citations omitted).
117. Adams ex rel. Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. 1992), over-
ruled by Watts ex rel. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo.
2012).
118. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 645.
119. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 522 (Kan. 2019).
120. Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Schmidt
ex rel. S.S. v. Bellevue Med. Ctr. L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 506 (2017).
121. Id. at 1042.
122. Rick Ruggles, $17 Million Awarded for Child with Brain Damage Born at Belle-





124. Ramsey, 860 F.3d at 1045.
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jury’s factual findings came “in the first instance,” but also that the
cap first “imposed an upper limit” on the jury’s determination. Simply,
the court clearly purports to acknowledge the constitutional mandate
that the jury “first” determine damages,125 despite immediately con-
tradicting itself by conceding that the effect of the cap supersedes the
jury’s findings. To say that the jury’s findings operated first, despite
the application of the cap, is no more than a semantic charade. In the
first instance, the jury determined $17 million, but first, the cap acted
to limit any award beyond $1.75 million.
Naturally, as did the Gourley state court, the circuit court in Ram-
sey discretely alluded to the principle that while the jury determines
the facts, the court must apply the law to those facts.126 This justifica-
tion for the theory that the jury “first” performed its function does not
address the actual constitutional question, however. The constitu-
tional question presented was not whether the jury first made a fac-
tual determination and the court subsequently applied the law to the
facts. The constitutional question was, rather, whether the Legisla-
ture first infringed on the constitutional right to the jury’s determina-
tion of damages and the jury was subsequently restricted by that
infringement.
The Eighth Circuit’s perfunctory analysis of the jury’s role, by fo-
cusing on the timing of the application of the law to the facts, disre-
garded Supreme Court precedent, including precedent in cases the
Ramsey court cited in the preceding paragraph of its analysis. Specifi-
cally, the Ramsey court relied on Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Televi-
sion for the proposition that a judge may not determine damages in
the first instance.127 However, and relevant to the correct constitu-
tional question presented in Ramsey, the Feltner court asserted that
where a right to damages determined by a jury existed at common
law, the Seventh Amendment mandates that the jury must determine
the fact and the amount of damages, lest their constitutional role be
violated.128
Merging the state and federal analyses then, the question becomes
whether the cause of action and right to a jury determination of dam-
ages existed at common law, either in Nebraska or federally. The
Gourley state court answered that question in the affirmative, as have
numerous Supreme Court cases at the federal level.129 The Gourley
state court’s dismissal of the constitutional question rested in its con-
125. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998).
126. Ramsey, 860 F.3d at 1045 (“[I]t is not the role of the jury to determine the legal
consequences of its factual findings.”).
127. Id.
128. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355.
129. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb.
Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 953–54, 663 N.W.2d 43, 75 (2003).
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clusion that “[i]f the Legislature has the constitutional power to abol-
ish a cause of action, it also has the power to limit recovery in a cause
of action.”130 However, similar to the Eighth Circuit, that overlooks
the actual constitutional question presented because the Nebraska
Legislature did not choose to abolish the cause of action. Therefore,
based on the correct question and the fact that the cause of action
indisputably survives, the Legislature disturbed the jury’s constitu-
tionally protected role by disrupting and limiting its fact-finding
power. Under both the Nebraska and Federal Constitutions, the NH-
MLA cap violates the Right to a Jury. Numerous other states have
reached this same conclusion on similar or related grounds, and it is
time for Nebraska to follow their lead.
b. Open Courts
Prendergast addressed the Open Courts challenge to the cap by ef-
fectively dismissing it on a theory that “[c]laimants are not denied ac-
cess to the courts. Those who do not elect otherwise are merely
required to follow a certain procedure before submitting their claims
to the courts.”131 The court was concerned primarily at that point with
whether the Medical Review Panel requirement of the Act precluded
access to the courts, and in that sense alone, the court’s logic is sound.
However, that analysis does little to address the constitution’s protec-
tion from damage caps.
Fortunately, the Gourley plaintiff diligently raised the Open
Courts challenge specifically to the application of the damage cap,
rather than under contention to the review panel requirement under
NHMLA.132 Instead of diving into a substantive analysis of Nebraska
constitutional law, however, the court first noted: “A majority of juris-
dictions have held that a cap on damages does not violate the open
courts and right to remedy provisions of their state constitution.”133
Following this statement was a list of nine cases from other jurisdic-
tions, nearly half of which have since been overruled or reversed. Four
of the remaining cases stand as good law in jurisdictions that do not
cap economic damages, and the remaining one is still good law in Indi-
ana, which currently has the lowest cap in the country.134
Short of citing other jurisdictions’ precedent, the Gourley court did
little to further explore the Open Courts provision, except to merge it
with an analysis of the Right to Remedy claim. In so doing, the court
concluded that because Nebraska has statutorily adopted the common
130. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 954, 663 N.W.2d at 75.
131. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 103, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663 (1977).
132. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 950, 663 N.W.2d at 73.
133. Id. at 951, 663 N.W.2d at 73.
134. See generally supra note 51.
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law of England,135 “[a]lthough plaintiffs have a right to pursue recog-
nized causes of action in court, they are not assured that a cause of
action will remain immune from legislative or judicial limitation or
elimination.”136 This accompanied a note that “[NHMLA] does not bar
access to the courts or deny a remedy. Instead it redefines the sub-
stantive law by limiting the amount of damages a plaintiff can re-
cover.”137 The lone citation for Nebraska’s Gourley conclusion that
there was no violation of the Open Courts provision was Adams, the
Missouri case mentioned above that was overruled specifically be-
cause the Missouri Supreme Court found that the state’s malpractice
caps did in fact violate the Right to a Jury and Open Courts provisions
in its constitution.138
In lieu of substantive analysis or reliance on valid Nebraska prece-
dent, it is worth first looking at how one of Nebraska’s most oft-cited
sister states has considered the exact issue. The Florida Supreme
Court analyzed its functionally identical Open Courts provision thusly
when declaring the state’s malpractice cap unconstitutional:
Access to courts is granted for the purpose of redressing injuries. A plaintiff
who receives a jury verdict for, e.g., $1,000,000, has not received a constitu-
tional redress of injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily, caps the
recovery at $450,000. Nor, we add, because the jury verdict is being arbitrarily
capped, is the plaintiff receiving the constitutional benefit of a jury trial as we
have heretofore understood that right. Further, if the legislature may consti-
tutionally cap recovery at $450,000, there is no discernible reason why it could
not cap the recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or even
$1. . . . At least one of the appellees candidly argues that there is no constitu-
tional bar to completely abolishing noneconomic damages by requiring poten-
tial injured victims to buy insurance protecting themselves against economic
loss due to injury as an alternative remedy. That particular issue is not before
us but we note that if it were permissible to restrict the constitutional right by
legislative action, without meeting the conditions set forth in Kluger, the con-
stitutional right of access to the courts for redress of injuries would be subor-
dinated to, and a creature of, legislative grace or, as Mr. Smith puts it,
“majoritarian whim.” There are political systems where constitutional rights
are subordinated to the power of the executive or legislative branches, but
ours is not such a system.139
It is interesting to observe here that the Florida court suggested
that if the legislature was to abolish the cause of action, as both the
Florida and Nebraska Legislatures could theoretically do, there would
certainly be a violation of the Open Courts provision. This is certainly
135. NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-101 (Reissue 2010).
136. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 952, 663 N.W.2d at 74 (citing Adams ex rel. Adams v. Chil-
dren’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906 (Mo. 1992) (en banc), overruled by Watts
ex rel. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012)).
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Adams ex rel. Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 906
(Mo. 1992) (en banc), overruled by Watts ex rel. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs.,
376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012)).
139. Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088–89 (Fla. 1987).
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a valuable rebuttal to the Gourley court’s assertion that the Right to a
Jury is not violated because the Legislature can eliminate the cause of
action entirely if it wishes. In any event, the constitutional similari-
ties between the Nebraska and Florida constitutions, combined with
Nebraska’s frequent reliance on Florida law, and in conjunction with
the national trend away from caps (as evidenced by the only Gourley
case cited in defense having been overruled), should make this Open
Courts argument availing to future claimants.
Aside from the analysis under the Nebraska constitution’s Open
Courts provision, an analysis by the Eighth Circuit provides an inter-
esting argument under the Federal Constitution. In Ramsey the cir-
cuit court found that, without getting bogged down in common law,
the test of Open Courts is a simple evidentiary analysis.140 Specifi-
cally, the circuit court suggested that there can be no violation of Open
Courts under the Federal Constitution unless plaintiffs provide evi-
dence that they were unable to acquire an attorney to go to court for
them.141 In Ramsey, the plaintiff “ha[d] offered no proof that Ne-
braska’s cap, which has been in effect for decades, discourages lawyers
to the point of restricting access.”142 The circuit court cited as exam-
ples a pair of federal cases where plaintiffs had made showings that
data or affidavits supported a finding that fewer lawyers were taking
malpractice cases in their jurisdictions.143
Open Courts challenges under federal law often require a showing
of procedural or substantive barriers to the courts, oftentimes arising
from conduct of the government that precludes one’s pursuit of a valid
underlying claim.144 To the extent that access to the courts may de-
pend on the willingness of counsel to represent claimants, the right
case may certainly overcome this showing, as medical costs continue
to rise. One can easily imagine a claimant such as in the Gourley or
Ramsey cases who, by the time the claim has waded through the court
system, has accumulated economic damages in excess of the NHMLA
cap. Such a situation would discourage a claimant from seeking relief
in the courts in the first place because one faced with such insur-
mountable economic damages is unlikely to want to spend additional
resources on the hundreds of thousands of dollars in actual expenses
(experts, discovery, etc.) that litigation would entail.
Further, in the event altruistic lawyers would pick up such a case
on a contingency basis in Nebraska and front such expenses, they are
either faced with the prospect of no recovery for themselves or with an
140. Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d 1038, 1046–47 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.
Schmidt ex rel. S.S. v. Bellevue Med. Ctr. L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 506 (2017).
141. Id. at 1047.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412–13 (2002).
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ethical dilemma. If a client’s economic damages are likely to exceed
the cap, even despite the best efforts of the subrogation process, the
lawyer’s first option is to recoup litigation expenses from the economic
damages recovery and take no fee. The lawyer’s second option is to
recoup the litigation expenses and then collect a fee (often between
40–50%), which poses an ethical, or at least a moral, dilemma given
that the award itself does not make the client whole. Neither option is
appealing, and both would reasonably discourage any malpractice at-
torney from embracing such a case. Moreover, it is ironic to suggest
that the Act would be unconstitutional on this theory only after the
court waits for evidence that lawyers get too expensive when the ex-
pense of lawyers was one of the express concerns of the NHMLA
Legislature.
c. Equal Protection
The Nebraska Supreme Court first wrangled an Equal Protection
challenge to the NHMLA in Prendergast.145 The court consolidated
the Director’s Due Process and Equal Protection claims and addressed
them with respect to contention against the NHMLA Medical Review
Panel.146 As with all Equal Protection arguments, framing is every-
thing, and the framing that the Director sought was that the unequal
classes were, respectively, claims covered by the NHMLA and all
other tort claims. After respectable analysis the court dismissed the
idea, finding a “rational relationship to the legitimate purposes of the
legislation.”147 So, the framing of disparate classifications of NHMLA
claimants and all other tort claimants demonstrates a “reasonable ba-
sis” that is “grounded upon real differences inherent in those tort
actions.”148
Years later, the Gourley court revisited the challenge but made a
significant about-face prior to its substantive analysis. One point of
interest is that in between these decisions, the Nebraska Legislature
amended its constitution to include Equal Protection in the Bill of
Rights.149 Though Gourley was decided just five years after this con-
stitutional amendment, the court did not even reference any bur-
geoning precedent, relying instead on its Equal Protection analyses
from pre-amendment cases. This is indicative of how, post-amend-
ment, “not much [ ] changed in the way of equal protection doctrine” in
Nebraska, whose “court[s do] not appear to be using the amendment
to depart from the equal protection standards developed before the
145. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 110–11, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667 (1977).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 112, 256 N.W.2d at 667.
148. Id. at 113–14, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
149. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3 (amended in 1998 by LR 20CA, 95th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
1997)).
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presence of [the] amendment.”150 So, it came to pass that the amend-
ment would neither bolster nor otherwise modify the deployment of
Equal Protection claims. Instead, Nebraska largely continues to apply
Federal Equal Protection doctrine to its analyses.
In light of that, the post-amendment Gourley court’s analysis
under the Nebraska constitution is particularly befuddling. The pre-
amendment Prendergast court opened part of its constitutional analy-
sis by saying: “We are dealing with the fundamental right to adequate
medical care.”151 The plaintiffs in Gourley, naturally then, sought
heightened scrutiny review of their Equal Protection challenge to the
NHMLA cap.152 The court curtly responded—without reference to
Prendergast—that “access to the courts to pursue redress for injuries
is not the type of fundamental right which requires heightened scru-
tiny.”153 Without addressing the fundamental right noted by the
plaintiff (access to healthcare), the court expressly noted that “the
Gourleys’ interest in unlimited damages is economic” and decided that
“[b]ecause the interests at issue are economic, we apply the rational
basis test.”154 No such distinction existed at the time under federal
precedent, nor did the Gourley court offer a reason for its assertion.
Following this bait and switch on fundamental rights, the court
proceeded to waddle through an analysis riddled with citations to
now-obsolete interjurisdictional precedent, to conclude:
Finally, we note that some jurisdictions have held that a cap on damages vio-
lates equal protection. In some cases, the jurisdiction applied a heightened
level of scrutiny, which we reject. Another is unclear about the level of scru-
tiny. Several fail to give deference to the Legislature and engage in judicial
factfinding, which we also reject. Another requires the provision of a replace-
ment remedy, quid pro quo, to limit recovery of damages, which we reject and
which will be discussed when dealing with the open courts provision of the
Nebraska Constitution. We find these cases unpersuasive. Thus, we conclude
that the cap on damages in § 44-2825 satisfies principles of equal
protection.155
The classifications, as framed before the Gourley court, were those
plaintiffs who would be unaffected by the cap and those with more
serious injuries who would be treated differently by the cap’s harsh
application. So, post-Prendergast, classifications distinguishing be-
tween NHMLA and all other tort claimants are unavailing. Similarly,
post-Gourley, classifications distinguishing between claimants who
150. MIEWALD ET AL., supra note 87, at 47.
151. Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 114, 256 N.W.2d at 668 (emphasis added).
152. Specifically, the Gourley plaintiffs argued for heightened scrutiny based on their
fundamental rights to a jury trial, a full remedy, their property, and adequate
medical care. See Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265
Neb. 918, 947, 663 N.W.2d 43, 71 (2003).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 950, 663 N.W.2d at 73 (internal citations omitted).
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may or may not be made whole under the cap are also doomed. It is
worth recalling that many jurisdictions that have found their caps un-
constitutional relied on this framing of the classifications to so find.
The mounting precedent on this front was likely abated by the court’s
dodge of the fundamental rights scrutiny. Regardless, in the sixteen
years since Gourley, there is overwhelming support for a revisit to the
Equal Protection claim, even under these classifications, and even
under a rational basis analysis. The Eighth Circuit has since reached
a conclusion nearly identical to Gourley under the Federal
Constitution.156
d. Special Legislation
The start of a Special Legislation analysis of the NHMLA cap nec-
essarily begins with Prendergast, but as will be seen, it has a unique
beginning and ending. The opening of the Prendergast analysis states
the following: “We have no question as to the right of the Director of
Insurance to question the act as special legislation and as granting the
credit of the state in aid of an individual, association, or corpora-
tion.”157 Despite this apparent assertion that the Special Legislation
argument had the best chances of bearing fruit, the opinion inexplica-
bly never directly addresses the constitutionality of the Act under the
Special Legislation doctrine—relying instead on what was actually an
Equal Protection analysis. More interestingly, the leading of four dis-
sents posited:
Two provisions of the act, restricting the potential liability of health care prov-
iders in malpractice cases, are clearly unconstitutional as special legislation.
Section 44-2819, R.S.Supp., 1976, provides that any payment to a claimant
from a nonrefundable medical reimbursement insurance plan, by reason of his
alleged injury, may be taken as a credit against any judgment rendered under
the act. This is a significant deviation from the total concept of restitution in
that a negligent party may escape paying for a portion of the damage he
causes. Section 44-2825, R.S.Supp., 1976, limits the total amount recoverable
under the act from a health care provider to $500,000. Likewise, section 44-
2825, R.S.Supp., 1976, provides for a shifting of the burden from the responsi-
ble health provider tort-feasor, but, here, the burden is shifted not to a collat-
eral source, but to the malpractice victim himself.158
The first dissent concluded by finding that “[s]ections 44-2819 and
44-2825, R.S.Supp., 1976, limiting a tort-feasor’s liability under the
act, are unconstitutional as special legislation prohibited by Article
III, section 18, of the Nebraska Constitution. These constitutionally
defective provisions are not cured by the election process provided by
the act.”159 The Gourley court would, years later, bumble through
156. Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d 1038, 1047–48 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.
Schmidt ex rel. S.S. v. Bellevue Med. Ctr. L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 506 (2017).
157. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 100, 256 N.W.2d 657, 662 (1977).
158. Id. at 129–30, 256 N.W.2d at 675–76 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 677.
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what the Prendergast court thought was an analysis of Special Legis-
lation, by way of several direct contradictions.
First, the Gourley court engaged in an analysis designed to distin-
guish between the constitutional interpretations under the similar-
but-distinct Equal Protection and Special Legislation provisions.160
Noting that “language normally applied to an equal protection analy-
sis is sometimes used to help explain the reasoning employed under a
special legislation analysis,” the court carefully observed that never-
theless “the focus of each test is different.”161 Despite its attention to
constitutional detail, the Gourley court, one paragraph later, quoted
three paragraphs from Prendergast ’s Equal Protection analysis in
support of its Special Legislation analysis.162
Regardless, the court explained that “[t]he analysis under a special
legislation inquiry focuses on the Legislature’s purpose in creating the
class and asks if there is a substantial difference of circumstances to
suggest the expediency of diverse legislation.”163 Interestingly, the
court concluded its dismissal of the Special Legislation argument
shortly thereafter by stating that “[i]t is not this court’s place to sec-
ond-guess the Legislature’s reasoning behind passing the act.”164 It is
unclear what the distinction between a legislature’s “purpose” and a
legislature’s “reasoning” is in this context, but whatever it may be the
Gourley court nonetheless undertook a Special Legislation analysis
specifically to determine the “purpose” and concluded that it was not
the court’s place to determine the “reasoning.”
In any event, we are left with a Prendergast decision (notably not a
majority opinion anyway) that (a) gives credit to the merits of a Spe-
cial Legislation argument, then (b) never addresses the argument
under a Special Legislation analysis, and (c) contains a lead dissent
that candidly opines as to the Act’s constitutional infirmity on Special
Legislation grounds. Most recently, we have a Gourley opinion that (a)
distinguishes between an Equal Protection analysis and a Special
Legislation analysis, then (b) relies on a previous Equal Protection
analysis in a Special Legislation analysis, and (c) recites the court’s
proper analysis for Special Legislation doctrine, but (d) claims it is not
the court’s role to perform that analysis.
Combining this wonky precedent with the interjurisdictional pre-
cedent outlined above, there is likely a strong argument that the NH-
MLA cap does, in fact, violate Nebraska’s Special Legislation
provision. Perhaps one cannot fault the court for what some commen-
160. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 939–40, 663 N.W.2d at 66.
161. Id. at 939, 663 N.W.2d at 66.
162. Id. at 939–40, 663 N.W.2d at 66 (quoting Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 115, 256
N.W.2d at 669).
163. Id. at 939, 663 N.W.2d at 66 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 943, 663 N.W.2d at 69 (emphasis added).
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tators have noted is an “ill-defined distinction” that “remains some-
what fleeting,” as between Special Legislation and Equal Protection
analyses.165 Regardless, it is incumbent upon the court to perform a
legitimate analysis of NHMLA under Nebraska’s Special Legislation
doctrine. Unlike the Equal Protection analysis, Special Legislation
may require a degree of scrutiny somewhat higher than rational basis,
though the Nebraska Supreme Court has yet to specifically answer
that question.166
For now, the court recognizes that the test is merely “different”167
to the extent that “[t]he analysis under a special legislation inquiry
focuses on the Legislature’s purpose in creating the class and asks if
there is a substantial difference of circumstances.”168 The “substan-
tial” qualifier likely suggests some heightened scrutiny nevertheless,
considering the Gourley court’s emphasis on purported “substantial
differences of situation or circumstances” in justifying the classifica-
tion at issue.169 The court has also added the substantiality qualifier
to another part of the Special Legislation test, distinguishing it from
the Equal Protection rationality test, in finding that the law must
“bear a reasonable and substantial relation” to the purpose of the
Legislature.170
With that in mind, the Gourley court quoted Prendergast to recog-
nize “a substantial difference between medical care providers and
other tort-feasors.”171 In so finding, the court emphasized the need to
“consider[ ] what the Legislature could have found at the time the act
was passed.”172 Given that the Legislature’s primary purpose was ad-
dressing “wild” and “skyrocketing” noneconomic damages awards in
order to keep insurance affordable for the class of medical providers, it
is crucial for the court to squarely address whether there is a substan-
tial difference between that class and every other class of tortfeasors
in the state.
It is increasingly difficult to ascertain how other professional mal-
practice policyholders or even non-professional insureds are substan-
tially differently situated than medical professionals. Why does a
lawyer, a premises owner, an automobile driver, an accountant, or any
other insured not also deserve protection from wild noneconomic dam-
ages awards? If the answer is that the Legislature was “substantially”
afraid that insurance would become unaffordable for doctors but not
165. MIEWALD ET AL., supra note 87, at 47, 159.
166. Id. at 157–58.
167. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 960, 663 N.W.2d at 80 (Connolly, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 939, 663 N.W.2d at 66 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 945, 663 N.W.2d at 69.
170. Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 714, 467 N.W.2d 836, 847 (1991) (emphasis
added).
171. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 940, 663 N.W.2d at 66.
172. Id. at 943, 663 N.W.2d at 68.
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these other classes, then it bears reminding that the Nebraska Medi-
cal Association and the insurance lobby were never able to produce
any evidence that doctors were actually leaving the state or retiring as
a result of the unavailability of insurance.173 “When the Legislature
confers privileges on a class arbitrarily selected from a large number
of persons standing in the same relation to the privileges, without rea-
sonable distinction or substantial difference, then the statute in ques-
tion has resulted in the kind of improper discrimination prohibited by
the Nebraska Constitution.”174
e. Takings Clause
Nebraska has but once addressed whether Nebraska’s Takings
Clause applies to capped damages. In Gourley, the court’s brief analy-
sis bears copying in its entirety:
Article I, § 21, applies to vested property rights.
As previously discussed, we have held that a person has no property and
no vested interest in any rule of the common law or a vested right in any
particular remedy. Further, courts have rejected the argument that a cause of
action and determination of damages are property. The cap on damages in
§ 44-2825 does not violate Neb. Const. art. I, § 21. We conclude that the
Gourleys’ argument is without merit.175
The court’s urgent dispatching of the Takings argument therefore
rests on three foundational presumptions: (1) Nebraska’s Takings
Clause applies only to vested property rights, (2) a person has neither
vested property nor vested interest in uncapped damages, and (3) a
determination of damages is not property.
The first and second underlying presumptions are that Nebraska’s
Takings Clause only applies to vested property rights, and that a per-
son does not have a vested interest in a remedy that the Legislature
has chosen to restrict. There is ample precedent that Nebraska has
indeed found the Takings Clause to apply only to vested property
rights.176 However, the assertion that a property right has not vested
in an award determination by a jury as the factfinder is inharmonious
with Nebraska precedent.
For example, Nebraska’s former wrongful death statute supplied
that the “personal representative” was to give the proceeds of any set-
tlement or awards to the court for distribution.177 In assessing the
interests of the beneficiaries, the court stated: “[The statute] makes it
173. See Hearing on LB 703 Before the Pub. Health & Welfare Comm., supra note 8.
174. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 976, 663 N.W.2d at 90 (McCormack, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846,
851, 620 N.W.2d 339, 344 (2000)).
175. Id. at 954, 663 N.W.2d at 76 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
176. See, e.g., Tracy v. City of Deshler, 253 Neb. 170, 568 N.W.2d 903 (1997).
177. See Hickman v. Sw. Dairy Suppliers, Inc., 194 Neb. 17, 24, 230 N.W.2d 99, 104
(1975).
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clear that no apparent heir or beneficiary . . . has any vested right to
any of the proceeds recovered in said action until . . . a determination
made by the court as to who is entitled to receive the proceeds and how
much.”178 In this context the court was fulfilling the jury’s role as a
factfinder, and the court concluded that after the factfinder makes a
determination of “who” is entitled to “how much,” a vested property
right manifests.
Similarly, Nebraska’s alimony system, for example, depends on the
court’s role as a factfinder in determining the value for alimony and
property rights assignments. The Nebraska Supreme Court has de-
clared that, “Such an award . . . whether intended solely as a property
settlement or as an allowance for support, or both, is such a definite
and final adjustment of mutual rights and obligations between hus-
band and wife as to be capable of a present vesting and to constitute
an absolute judgment.”179 Once a factual determination of the value of
an award is made, “upon its entry, that amount became vested and
not subject to modification.”180
In Nebraska, “[t]he type of right that ‘vests’ can be generally de-
scribed as ‘an interest which it is proper for the state to recognize and
protect and of which the individual may not be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice.’”181 “With respect to property, a right is considered
to be ‘vested’ if it involves ‘an immediate fixed right of present or fu-
ture enjoyment and an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a
present fixed right of future enjoyment.’”182 For a right to be vested, it
“must be ‘fixed, settled, absolute, and not contingent upon any-
thing.’”183 Though the Nebraska Supreme Court has not yet analyzed
the damage caps under the state’s property law, these propositions
would be the likely starting point. A likely conclusion based on the
existing cap precedent would be that the court would find the cap to be
a “condition” or that the factfinder’s determination is not the “abso-
lute” or “settled” interest. These findings are likely distinguishable be-
cause the relevant precedent considers actual real property
expectation and remainder interests as “conditions.”
Regardless, recall that the Gourley court’s third underlying pre-
sumption is that a factual determination of damages is not property.
In support of this, the court merely recites that “courts have rejected
178. Id. at 24–25, 230 N.W.2d at 104 (emphasis added).
179. Torrey v. Torrey, 206 Neb. 485, 490, 293 N.W.2d 402, 406 (1980).
180. Id.
181. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of La Vista, 285 Neb. 579, 592, 831 N.W.2d 23, 33
(2013) (quoting 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 746 at 190 (2009)).
182. Id. at 592, 831 N.W.2d at 34 (quoting 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 746
at 191 (2009)).
183. Id. at 592, 831 N.W.2d at 33–34 (quoting 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law
§ 746 at 191 (2009)).
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th[at] argument.”184 This notably falls short of an actual analysis of
Nebraska’s Takings Clause and property law. The court cited only two
cases, one from Alaska and one from Virginia (which has the third
lowest cap in the country behind Indiana and Nebraska),185 in sup-
port of that conclusory assertion.186 Contrary to the Nebraska court’s
finding, the Virginia case cited did not consider whether a cause of
action and determination of damages are property.187 Rather, its
analysis focused on how the state’s Takings Clause did not protect a
common law right to uncapped damages because the legislature had
permissibly abolished that right.188 Nowhere did the Virginia court
discuss whether or not a determination of damages or cause of action
are “property.”
Similarly, the Alaska case cited did not mention whether a cause of
action or determination of damages are property.189 Rather, in ad-
dressing a cap on punitive damages under its Takings Clause, the
Alaska court found that a taking only occurs where “the statute affects
a property interest in punitive damages that has already vested.”190
The question for the Alaska court then became whether the statutory
cap applied before or after the award of damages. The Alaska court
concluded, “If [the cap statute] is construed as a cap on punitive dam-
ages, limiting them before they are awarded to successful plaintiffs, no
constitutional problem exists.”191 To wash their hands of it, the
Alaska court concluded that caps apply before the award, and thus
there was no constitutional infirmity.192 Recall also that the Alaska
court was addressing a cap on punitive damages, which are unavaila-
ble in Nebraska.
f. Timing Arguments
In all, these arguments tacitly propose that if the cap in Nebraska
is construed to apply before the factfinder determines damages and
the vested right accrues at the time the factfinder makes the determi-
nation, there is no constitutional infirmity. However, this conflicts
with Nebraska precedent. Specifically, recall that Nebraska has found
that the cap must be applied after the factfinder makes its determina-
tion but before the court—acting not as a factfinder but as the agent of
184. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 954,
663 N.W.2d 43, 76 (2003).
185. See supra subsection III.A.1.a.ii.
186. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 954, 663 N.W.2d at 76.
187. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va.
1999).
188. Id. at 317–18.
189. Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002).
190. Id. at 1058 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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law—issues its judgment, so as to reduce the gross damages rather
than the net capped damages.193 This means that the vested right
arising from the factfinder’s determination is in fact impacted by a cap
applied after the award. Thus, reducing the award to satisfy the cap
necessarily violates the Takings Clause of the Nebraska constitution.
Despite this, both the Gourley court and the Eighth Circuit Ramsey
court suggest that the cap is applied after the factfinder makes its de-
termination but before the court “applies the law to the facts” or “re-
duce[s the award] to a final judgment,” respectively.194 Fortunately,
Nebraska has taken a firm position on exactly when the cap applies:
“[A] statutory limitation on damages . . . ‘applies to cap the total recov-
ery after the reduction of the plaintiff’s damages for his or her compar-
ative negligence, rather than applying [it] . . . before the reduction . . . ,
since the latter approach would multiply the effect of the damage limi-
tation.’”195 Therefore, Nebraska has conceded that the cap takes effect
after the award determination. Based on Nebraska’s reliance on
Alaska’s case, Nebraska has conceded that this is an unconstitutional
taking.
Further, this does not preclude the Right to a Jury or Open Courts
arguments given that either: (a) the jury is still denied an unhindered
opportunity to make a determination of damages in the first instance
because the Act itself did so, or (b) the Nebraska court will have to
concede the conflict and recognize that, under the respective prece-
dent they have relied upon, one or the other constitutional argument
is valid.
2. Economic Damages Distinction
a. Economic Versus Noneconomic Damages Generally
The Takings Clause argument is particularly availing when the
cap is applied to situations where actual, ascertainable economic dam-
ages are being denied by the courts. Similarly, many of the other de-
fenses of the cap drafted in the Nebraska courts are also strikingly
hollow in light of Nebraska’s bar of actual sustained and other non-
speculative or future damages. In Gourley, Nebraska Supreme Court
Judge Gerrard opined in concurrence that:
Given the stark comparison between the assets of the Fund and the potential
poverty that can result from forcing negligently injured persons to find their
own means of paying for catastrophic medical expenses, it may ultimately be
193. Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131, 159, 816 N.W.2d 742, 765 (2012).
194. Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d 1038, 1046 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.
Schmidt ex rel. S.S. v. Bellevue Med. Ctr. L.L.C., 138 S. Ct. 506 (2017); Gourley ex
rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 954, 663 N.W.2d
43, 75 (2003).
195. Connelly, 284 Neb. at 159, 816 N.W.2d at 764–65 (emphasis added) (quoting 57
AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, etc., Tort Liability § 602 at 611 (2012)).
2020] THE DAMAGES OF CAPS IN NEBRASKA 243
determined that the act, in capping recovery for economic damages, is uncon-
stitutional as applied to plaintiffs whose proven economic damages exceed the
cap. . . .
. . . .
. . . . [T]he discretion of the Legislature is circumscribed, as always, by the
Nebraska Constitution, particularly where the abrogation of fundamental
rights is concerned. The effect of the act on a substantial right—recovery of
economic damages—is especially troubling, and potentially unreasonable,
when balanced against the negligible effect that such recovery would have on
the Fund.
. . . .
As previously stated, I concur, albeit grudgingly, in the per curiam opin-
ion’s conclusions regarding the constitutional challenges to the act. I join in
the opinion of the court regarding the other issues presented. I remain deeply
troubled by the public policy choices reflected in the act, particularly the de-
nial of economic recovery to negligently injured persons. It is pointedly unfair,
and may well prove unconstitutional, for the law of this state to safeguard a
surplus of tens of millions of dollars in the Excess Liability Fund by denying
negligently injured persons money for needed medical care and potentially
condemning them to undue poverty.196
Judge Gerrard engaged in a lengthy explanation of the distinction
between economic and noneconomic damages. Referring to the restric-
tion on economic damages as a “fundamental flaw” in the Act, Judge
Gerrard articulated that economic damage awards should include “the
cost of medical care, past and future, and related benefits, i.e., lost
wages, loss of earning capacity, and other such losses.”197 However,
Judge Gerrard was possibly too optimistic when he noted that
“[n]oneconomic damages are generally the largest portion of a medical
liability settlement,” at least to the extent his assertion applied to fu-
ture economic damage cases.198 In acknowledgment of this concern
though, he concluded that the cap was likely unconstitutional, at least
as applied to cases where economic damages exceed the cap, noting
that the constitution would “pre[c]lude application of the cap where it
would prevent a complete recovery of economic damages.”199 There-
fore, he opined, the Act would not be inoperable, but the cap merely
would not be applied in such a case.
However, it is also likely that allowing as-applied exceptions for
economic damages would in itself render the Act unconstitutional. It
is certainly a just and fair assertion that the cap should not apply to
economic damages, which would align Nebraska with the majority of
other states. However, consider two hypothetical cases before the Ne-
braska court. Plaintiff A is awarded a verdict containing $5 million in
economic damages (a modest recovery for future earnings and medical
treatment) and $2.25 million in noneconomic damages (say, pain and
196. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 968–70, 663 N.W.2d at 85–86 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 961, 663 N.W.2d at 80.
198. Id. at 962, 663 N.W.2d at 81.
199. Id. at 969, 663 N.W.2d at 85.
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suffering and consortium). Plaintiff B is awarded $5 million in
noneconomic damages and $2.25 million in economic damages. It
would likely not feel fair to reduce Plaintiff B’s settlement per the cap
to $2.25 million and apply the cap to effect a complete elimination of
noneconomic damages. For Plaintiff A, would the cap apply at all?
Further, can it be fairly said that Plaintiffs A and B are treated
equally if only one of their awards is reduced? No matter which of
several approaches the court may use to distinguish between the re-
ductions in these two cases, there are classifications being made that
treat each case differently. Under the circumstances, such classifica-
tions are only arguably rationally related to the original purpose of the
NHMLA, particularly given that both original awards would have the
same effect on the insurance industry, and therefore, the availability
of qualified medical service providers. As long as the cap continues to
operate indiscriminately on both economic and noneconomic damages,
there will be an increasing number of cases where claimants are de-
nied numerous constitutional protections.
b. Nebraska’s Near-Precedent on Economic Damage
Distinctions
The foregoing analysis is not to say that the cap is otherwise con-
stitutional, but it is easy to see how its constitutional infirmity is par-
ticularly egregious in cases with high economic damages. Prendergast
was not a majority opinion, a challenge to its precedential value that
was raised and dismissed in Gourley after the court concluded that
“only three judges are necessary to determine that an act is constitu-
tional.”200 The Nebraska constitution mandates that no Act “shall be
held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges,”201 but
the Gourley court concluded that “only three judges are necessary to
determine that an act is constitutional.”202 Notably, it is arguable that
this provision in the Nebraska constitution is, itself, unconstitutional
as against the Federal Constitution. This argument has actually been
noted, but not addressed, by one member of a four-judge majority that
failed to overturn a Nebraska law in one such case.203 For better or
worse, the supermajority requirement in the Nebraska constitution
permits cases such as Prendergast, where a majority of the judges be-
lieve NHMLA to be unconstitutional, and yet the law stands.
200. See generally id. at 940, 663 N.W.2d at 66–67; Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb.
97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
201. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2; see, e.g., State ex rel. Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands &
Funds, 184 Neb. 621, 171 N.W.2d 156 (1969).
202. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 940, 663 N.W.2d at 67.
203. State ex rel. Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 185 Neb. 270, 283–84, 175
N.W.2d 63, 70 (1970) (Spencer, J., dissenting).
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Specifically, the Prendergast and Gourley concurrences and dis-
sents noted numerous constitutional infirmities with NHMLA’s dam-
age cap. For example, Judge White noted in his Prendergast dissent
that parts of the Act “restricting the potential liability of health care
providers in malpractice cases, are clearly unconstitutional as special
legislation.”204 In recognizing that the Prendergast court was not
presented with all of the constitutionality issues that the justices iden-
tified in their discussions, Judge White opined: “The majority opin-
ion’s holding of constitutionality of the act is limited only to those
issues discussed therein.”205 Judge White then noted that a finding
that one part of “the act is constitutional should not be interpreted as
a determination that all sections of the act are constitutional.”206
As quoted above, Judge Gerrard found in Gourley that the cap’s
“unwarranted restriction on economic damages is, in my view, a fun-
damental flaw.”207 This is a testament to his careful consideration of
the legislative history of the Act’s cap, noting that the Legislature’s
original intent was to apply the cap only to “general” damages, not
economic damages.208 In this way, his concurrence acknowledges that
the application of the cap to economic and noneconomic damages is a
judicial construct, rather than a legislative one.
c. Severability of the NHMLA Cap
In Gourley, the lower court had found the cap severable from the
rest of NHMLA, a finding that the Nebraska Supreme Court did not
have to address after finding it constitutional.209 The district court
did, however, identify that the Act contains a severability clause, and
the Nebraska Supreme Court typically tests severability by looking to
whether “[t]he valid portions of the act can be enforced independently,
and the invalid portions did not constitute an inducement to passage
of the act as a whole.”210 As the bill’s sponsor put it on the floor of the
Legislature with respect to the cap: “[W]e recognize that there is the
threat of unconstitutionality in this area . . . . The doctors are willing
to accept the risk that it might not be constitutional. . . . If it is uncon-
stitutional the severability clause comes into play, and it is out.”211
It is certainly true, as the Prendergast and Gourley concurrences
and dissents noted, that the Act would continue to function without
the damage cap. The Act is a complex scheme defining multiple as-
204. Prendergast, 199 Neb. at 129, 256 N.W.2d at 675 (White, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 677.
206. Id. at 128, 256 N.W.2d at 675.
207. Gourley, 265 Neb. at 961, 663 N.W.2d at 80 (Gerrard, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 963, 663 N.W.2d at 81.
209. Id. at 924, 663 N.W.2d at 56 (majority opinion).
210. Snyder v. IBP, Inc., 229 Neb. 224, 229, 426 N.W.2d 261, 265 (1988).
211. Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, supra note 10, at 8639.
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pects of medical liability, creating a state damages fund, establishing
a review panel, fixing limitations periods, and providing numerous
other guidelines for medical providers and claimants alike. Further,
because the economic damages application is a judicial construct, a
finding restricted to enforcing the cap only as against noneconomic
damages does not even implicate a severability analysis.
d. Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance
The Nebraska Supreme Court first announced the avoidance the-
ory in 1919, declaring that: “It is the policy of the courts to uphold
rather than overthrow legislative action.”212 At the time Gourley was
decided, the court’s policy on avoidance was that: “[W]here a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, under one of which the statute is
valid while under the other of which the statute would be unconstitu-
tional or of doubtful validity, that construction which results in valid-
ity is to be adopted.”213
Not only does the NHMLA cap raise multiple constitutional ques-
tions on its face, but its application to economic damages exacerbates
this concern as noted by multiple concurrences and dissents in the
seminal cases. Moreover, as first noted by Senator Chambers, the Leg-
islature was well aware of the cap’s questionable constitutionality.214
In fact, the Legislature heard conflicting testimony that other states
at that point had already found their caps unconstitutional.215 As a
matter of judicial construction, the court’s treatment of economic dam-
ages as falling under the purview of the cap represents the antithesis
of constitutional avoidance.
As evidenced above, there were a multitude of reasons for the Pren-
dergast and Gourley courts to recognize that at the very least their
decisions would raise serious constitutional concerns. As a result, the
courts should have avoided the construction they adopted. Reflecting
on (1) the number of overturned cases the Nebraska Supreme Court
has relied on in its past constitutional analyses, (2) the strong concur-
rences and dissents in Prendergast and Gourley, as well as (3) Ne-
braska’s current anomalous divergence from other states with respect
to the cap’s application to total damages, there is ample evidence for
212. Union Stockyards Co. v. State Ry. Comm’n of Neb., 103 Neb. 224, 226, 170 N.W.
908, 909 (1919), modified sub nom. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Neb. State Ry.
Comm’n, 103 Neb. 224, 170 N.W. 908 (1919).
213. State v. Burke, 225 Neb. 625, 633, 408 N.W.2d 239, 246 (1987) (citing State v.
Evans, 215 Neb. 433, 439, 338 N.W.2d 788, 793 (1983)).
214. Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, supra note 10, at 8585 (“A law can be 100 percent
unconstitutional, but until such time as it is challenged in court and declared to
be unconstitutional it is the law.”).
215. Id. at 9445.
2020] THE DAMAGES OF CAPS IN NEBRASKA 247
the next challenger to successfully raise a constitutional avoidance ar-
gument at least with respect to economic damages.
e. Conclusion on Distinguishing Economic from Noneconomic
Damages
The Gourley court was cognizant of the harsh application of the cap
to economic damages. In addressing this concern, the court simply
noted that other courts have approved of such application by citing to
the states that currently rank first, third, and fourth in terms of low-
est recoveries under the caps.216 This, at the least, fell short of a com-
prehensive analysis, leaving ample room for revisiting the issue,
particularly given the number of relied-upon states that have since
reversed course. Also, recall that the application of the cap to economic
damages is a judicial construct rather than a legislative mandate.
Further, the Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized that severabil-
ity is an option for the cap that would not disturb the rest of the NH-
MLA. Lastly, the court’s application of the cap to economic damages is
perhaps one of the most egregious examples of disregard for the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance that currently exists in Nebraska
law. The effective denial of any general recovery, in addition to preclu-
sion from even an economic recovery for claimants injured under the
Act, is, as Senator Chambers put it to the floor, “unconscionable.”217
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are innumerable arguments and references contained herein
that may serve the next round of litigators in their challenges to the
NHMLA cap. There is also ample support cited herein for a bold prac-
titioner to make a strong case to the Legislature that the law must
change. Below is a synopsis of the strongest arguments presented
herein.
A. Court Action
1. Conformity with Other States
Perhaps the strongest argument, by way of visual aid, is to pull up
Gourley and Prendergast on your favorite legal search platform. Even
only sixteen years since Gourley was decided, a simple scroll through
the case will reveal no fewer than twenty-four red flags in the consti-
tutional analysis section. As the interjurisdictional synthesis herein
demonstrates, supra section III.A, Nebraska has assumed the role of
perhaps the most restricted recovery state in the country. This is a
216. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 265 Neb. 918, 949,
663 N.W.2d 43, 72 (2003); see Goguen, supra note 49.
217. Floor Debate on LB 434, 703, supra note 10, at 8652.
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direct result of the interplay between the effective bar on punitive
damages, the existence of the cap, and the application of the cap to
both noneconomic and economic damages. The Nebraska courts have
not been directly confronted with the effect of this trifecta in the con-
text of the position it places Nebraska in with respect to her sister
states.
It would certainly be prudent to have a prepared piecemeal argu-
ment for a district court that, case by case, revokes the precedent of
the foreign cases Nebraska has relied upon in the past for each pro-
position of law. Each since-overruled case Gourley relied upon opens a
fissure in the strength of its precedential value. To capitalize on the
weight of this overturned precedent, many of the cases cited herein
contain an express reference to Nebraska, in addition to each of those
courts’ express rejection of Nebraska’s law. Nebraska’s position as a
holdout state for claimants’ rights is an unenviable position from a
policy-optics standpoint. Stare decisis only carries a court’s decision so
far when the court is faced with the reality that Nebraska is, if not the
harshest, at least one of three harshest states on injured malpractice
victims in the country.
2. Constitutional Reconsideration
The first effort that practitioners must take in their next challenge
of the NHMLA damage cap is to hammer every constitutional argu-
ment at every stage of litigation. In both Prendergast and Gourley, the
concurrences and dissents noted that several constitutional argu-
ments may have had traction, except that they were either not raised
below or were not adequately argued on appeal. The plethora of in-
terjurisdictional precedent that has been reversed since Nebraska last
relied upon it is perhaps the best evidence of the courts’ need to recon-
sider the constitutionality of the NHMLA damage cap.
However, as discussed herein, supra section III.B, many of the con-
stitutional defenses of the cap that the Nebraska Supreme Court has
made based on its own precedent fall short on substantive analyses.
Several of them are likely simply misplaced. To that end, the plaintiffs
in the trio of Nebraska cases on the NHMLA’s damage cap constitu-
tionality (Prendergast, Gourley, and Ramsey) each made a tactical de-
cision to deploy a shotgun approach to the constitutional arguments.
This was likely wise given the opportunity to be heard in front of the
Nebraska Supreme Court at all on the issue. However, this has proven
to consistently result in a lack of substantive response on some of the
stronger issues, oftentimes resulting in three-sentence dismissals of
the claim.
Noting that only one argument has to win, a rifle approach may be
better depending on the future composition of the court. For example,
the catch-22 the court has placed itself in with respect to the Right to
2020] THE DAMAGES OF CAPS IN NEBRASKA 249
a Jury and Takings Clause “before-or-after” paradox may be worth
strategically deploying by itself. Similarly, the Special Legislation ar-
gument has been considered by concurrences and dissents to be a
strong unconstitutionality argument since Prendergast and may well
be the breakthrough on its own.
3. Novel Approaches with the Courts
Practitioners should be willing to make bold and novel claims to
the extent they are supported by our precedent and that of Nebraska’s
sister states. This may involve framing old arguments in new ways,
developing new arguments, or simply creating an argument that is
better supported and easier to read than the other side’s brief. For
example, Nebraska courts’ perpetual confusion over the correct dis-
tinction between Equal Protection and Special Legislation analyses
provides an opportunity for a prepared litigator to win either argu-
ment. Specifically, if a lawyer can package the distinction in a way
that clearly delineates between the two tests, they may succeed in an
argument that the standard of review is in fact higher in Special Leg-
islation. Either way, because the Nebraska courts seem to struggle
with the distinction, they may be more likely to give weight to which-
ever attorney can present the cleanest distinction.
Similarly, with either Special Legislation or Equal Protection, the
framing of classifications can make or break an argument. To the ex-
tent Nebraska is hung up on the right to damages being a purely eco-
nomic interest, with a claimant having no right to uncapped damages,
the next litigator should invoke classifications that reference the ac-
tual fundamental right identified by Prendergast—adequate medical
care. First, one may see fit to re-challenge the previously rejected clas-
sification of below-cap claims versus above-cap claims. One should ar-
gue under this classification that increased liability improves the
standard of care, which in turn protects the recognized “fundamental
right” to adequate medical care. Second, the next litigator to reach the
courts on this issue may use all of the courts’ previous language on the
risk of providers turning opt-out patients away (opt-outs as a class),
or, conversely, of providers who have not opted into coverage or have
lapsed (noncovered providers as a class), both of which would also
speak directly to the fundamental right to quality medical care.
Aside from reframing issues and creating novel classifications, the
greatest opportunity for forward momentum likely manifests in the
weight of the interjurisdictional policy that is now contrary to Ne-
braska’s. It is certainly a fairly anticipated argument, oft-recited by
the courts, that it is up to the Legislature, not the courts, to determine
the policy of Nebraska. However, it is a sound rebuttal to scour the
legislative history for the myriad places where the NHMLA legislators
expressed the questionable constitutionality of the Act, in conjunction
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with legislators’ observations that it is up to the courts to make such a
determination and sever the cap from the rest of the Act. In any event,
there are many arguments and referential sources captured herein
that will allow for some revised, strengthened, and new arguments to
deliver to the courts.
B. Legislative Action
1. Pure Removal of the Cap
Because it is unlikely that Nebraska is soon to reverse course on its
stance on punitive damages, the Legislature must be made aware of
Nebraska’s uniquely restrictive position with respect to recovery. The
concerns expressed by the legislators who debated the original Act and
the Prendergast dissenters have certainly proven valid. On one hand,
the Legislature may simply find affirmation in the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s tolerance of the cap. On the other, no legislator wants to wear
a badge that says: “My state is the harshest in the country on injured
malpractice victims.” It is likely that legislators are simply unaware of
the interplay between Nebraska’s rejection of punitive damages, the
NHMLA cap, and the court’s interpretation of the cap with respect to
economic damages.
For the reasons outlined throughout this Comment, there is ample
support for the notion that the cap serves no purpose at all, except to
provide a special benefit to the medical lobby at the expense of se-
verely injured Nebraska citizens. There has been, and likely continues
to be, no credible evidence that a mass exodus of providers will occur if
we eliminate the cap. Indeed, the vast majority of states have contin-
ued to retain medical professionals despite their lack of caps. Addi-
tionally, there is likely no evidence that because of Nebraska’s current
rank among the top three provider-friendly cap states, Nebraska has
been able to attract and retain providers that it otherwise would not
have been able to recruit.
Moreover, though increasing costs of medical care continue to re-
sult in more capped cases, the reality is that the actual number of
“wild” awards is quite low. There is likely no evidence that “wild” set-
tlements dramatically alter, in any significant way, either the availa-
bility of coverage for providers or the cost of that coverage which is
passed on to customers. Further, if an underlying purpose of the Act
was to ensure the availability of recovery, there is almost certainly no
credible evidence that either (a) Nebraska claimants would lose that
opportunity without the cap, or (b) citizens of states that do not have
caps have been unable to recover for malpractice.
Lastly, malpractice awards improve the standard of care. A severe
injury is often the result of an egregiously negligent act or omission.
Capping awards, particularly to the extent they preclude even a full
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economic recovery for seriously injured claimants, incentivizes disre-
gard for the most crucial standards of care. Additionally, if a pro-
vider’s negligence results in extensive economic damages and a
claimant is prevented from being made whole, that provider has im-
posed potentially significant costs on other providers. To wit, consider
the Ramsey case, where the family anticipated nearly $5 million in
actual economic expenses as a result of the provider’s negligence. The
provider’s insurer was liable (in coordination with the state’s excess
liability fund) for only $1.75 million. The rest of society is going to
suffer the balance of those damages as a result of that provider’s
negligence.
Further, imagine being a continuing care provider for that claim-
ant. You are certainly disincentivized to provide them the best care
because of the claimant’s inability to obtain insurance or otherwise
pay for your services. As a result of one provider’s negligence, and the
protection afforded to that provider by the NHMLA cap, this family is
now unable to find adequate medical care. Recall that the first sen-
tence of the NHMLA Act reads as follows: “The Legislature finds and
declares that it is in the public interest that competent medical and
hospital services be available to the public in the State of Ne-
braska . . . .”218 In an increasing number of cases, the Act’s cap tacitly
defeats the Act’s stated purpose.
2. Increasing and Aligning Cap
This is certainly an option for the Legislature. However, in light of
the myriad problems with the cap discussed herein, this solution does
little more than kick the can down the road. Between Nebraska, Vir-
ginia, and Indiana, it is as though the three states are engaged in a
staring contest. As soon as one of the three holdout states blinks and
decides to remove its caps, it is likely the other two will follow. At this
point, in constitutional defense of their caps as currently applied to all
damages, the three courts only have each other to rely upon for prece-
dential support. Because the debates in the Legislature are certain to
demand a summary of other states’ current position on caps, it would
be embarrassing for Nebraska to wait until it is the last—and thus
certainly the most restrictive—cap in the country to amend it. To that
extent, increasing the cap to align it more substantively with the ma-
jority of the states may seem like an option for a legislature concerned
with optics. But again, such a solution does little more than kick the
can down the road.
218. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2801 (Reissue 2010).
252 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:209
3. Removal of Economic Damages Application
Because the cap’s application to economic damages is a judicial
construct and not rooted in the text of the Act, this is likely a tricky
legislative proposition. It is certainly attractive to suggest an amend-
ment that contains language such as “such limitation on damages
shall apply only to those determinations made by the factfinder that
related to a claimant’s pain and suffering or loss of consortium.” How-
ever, this does little to resolve general verdict awards, or determina-
tions that fail to adequately break out what specific damages are
attributable to which losses. Further, it will not take more than one or
two newspaper articles for jurors to begin attributing all damages to
allocations other than pain and suffering, for example.
If removal of the cap in its entirety is not an option for the Legisla-
ture, any amendment to restrict application of the cap to noneconomic
damages will likely spawn a wave of litigation that necessarily parses
and redefines entire categories of damages. However, it is possible
that the Legislature could structure an amendment in such a way as
to have a comparable effect without engaging legal terms of art. For
example, the Legislature may address the core concern directly with
language such as “any limitation on recovery under this section shall
not affect any claimant’s right to that portion of an award of damages
determined by the factfinder to be economic in nature and ascertaina-
ble at the time of such determination.” Such an amendment invokes
language for which judicial construction is well-established and would
serve to apply the cap to the damages originally contemplated by the
Legislature.
4. Adjustment for Inflation
A last point of concern is that adjustment to the cap currently de-
pends on the initiative of a legislator voluntarily amending the recov-
erable limitation value. Historically, this has been done just about
every decade and appears to approximate the original cap’s inflation
adjustment at around the five-year midpoint of each successive
amendment. This rewards a claimant whose claim arises the year the
amendment takes effect with an over-adjusted value, as compared to
the claimant whose claim arises the year before the next modification.
Notwithstanding the possible constitutional questions that raises, it is
unnecessary and risky. Nebraska is familiar with using cost-of-living
adjustments in its statutes, and tying the future values to an objective
standard will undoubtedly prevent unnecessary squabbling.
V. CONCLUSION
Nebraska, once an intentional leading advocate for claimants’
rights, has fallen behind the times with respect to the NHMLA cap on
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damage awards. Nebraska now finds itself in the regrettable position
of having one of the three most restrictive bars to recovery for injured
malpractice victims in the country. Legislative and judicial disregard
of this status will continue to stain Nebraska in the eyes of her sister
states, as recently evidenced when the Gourley claimant was featured
on HBO’s documentary “Hot Coffee.”219 Since the Gourley case, the
majority of the states on whose precedent the court relied have
changed course, most often rejecting their malpractice caps com-
pletely. The Nebraska courts rely on the Legislature to assert the pol-
icy of the state, and the Legislature relies on the courts to define that
policy. However, both the Legislature and the courts have within their
power the ability to rectify Nebraska’s stalwart adherence to objec-
tionable legislative and judicial precedent. There is no justifiable ra-
tionale for Nebraska’s reliance on the past as a defense of the NHMLA
damage cap. Nebraska may do well to recognize that nearly all of the
other states in the country have in fact rejected such a policy, opting
instead to look to the future for the protection of their citizens. Per-
haps the arguments and references noted in this Comment will help
move Nebraska into the future with respect to the NHMLA cap. If
Nebraska continues to look to the past under the guise of stare decisis,
she is likely to soon find herself as the only state placing such harsh
restrictions on her citizens. In the words of Justice Cardozo:
I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought
not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed. I think that when a
rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsis-
tent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less
hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment. . . . “That court best serves
the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote
generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another gener-
ation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of
law represents what should be according to the established and settled judg-
ment of society . . . .”220
219. HOT COFFEE (HBO television broadcast June 27, 2011); see, e.g., “Hot Coffee”
Exposes How Hard Caps on Malpractice Awards Shift Burden to Taxpayers,
DEMOCRACYNOW! (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.democracynow.org/2011/1/25/hard
_caps_on_malpractice_awards_shift [https://perma.unl.edu/U5WE-TMRJ].
220. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Adherence to Precedent: The Subconscious Element in the
Judicial Process, William I. Storrs Lecture Series Before the Law School of Yale
University (1921), in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 1921, at 150–51.
